Trump’s Iran offensive has failed to generate the usual wartime approval boost, with rising domestic dissent and key resignations weakening his position ahead of midterms.
NATO allies have refused to back the US, citing legal and strategic limits, exposing fractures in traditional Western military alignment.
Despite military superiority, the US faces economic and geopolitical constraints, particularly around oil markets, making a prolonged conflict difficult to sustain alone.
Unlike the typical support a president receives in the early stages of a military offensive, US President Donald Trump has not seen the usual surge in popularity. A combined poll by NBC News shows that 54% of respondents disapprove of how he has handled the situation in Iran.
Trump’s second term, which began in January 2025, has already been marked by an unprecedented level of military aggression, with strikes or bombings reported in seven countries within a single year—Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Nigeria, and Venezuela.
2 March 2026
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On February 28, Washington and Tel Aviv launched a coordinated strike on Tehran, resulting in over 2,000 civilian deaths and the killing of Iran’s Supremeo, Ali Khamenei. Tensions had been escalating for months over Iran’s nuclear programme, with the US building its largest military presence in the region since the 2003 Iraq War.
While Iran is unlikely to win a conventional conflict against the US, its strategy appears to be centred on making the war economically and politically unsustainable for Washington.
Notably, the US has refrained from targeting Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil export hub. This restraint signals that while Washington has the capacity to cripple Iran’s economy, it is deliberately avoiding actions that could destabilise global oil markets. Any direct hit on Iran’s oil infrastructure could send prices soaring, risk a global economic shock, and ultimately backfire on the US economy.
Discontent over Trump’s decisions on Iran is not confined to the United States. In an attempt to build international support, Trump has pressured West Asian countries to join his campaign against Tehran. He has also urged Western allies—and even strategic competitors such as China—to support the war effort.
In a more coercive tone, he warned NATO members that they would face a “very bad” future if they refused to participate. Germany’s defence minister, however, offered a blunt response: “This is not our war.”
The Trump administration is beginning to confront a familiar reality—ending a war without a coalition of allies and international legitimacy is far more difficult than starting one.
Why Didn’t NATO Back the US?
The United States, one of NATO’s 12 founding members in 1949, was instrumental in shaping the alliance under President Harry S. Truman. NATO’s core principle of collective defence has long served as a pillar of transatlantic security.
However, most NATO allies have made it clear that they do not wish to be involved in the US-led intervention in Iran—a decision Trump has labelled a “foolish mistake.” He has argued that while allies privately support the US-Israel position, they are unwilling to participate militarily.
Trump has previously threatened to withdraw the US from NATO, though he stopped short of repeating that threat recently. In a post on Truth Social, he wrote: “Because of the fact that we have had such military success, we no longer ‘need,’ or desire, the NATO countries’ assistance—WE NEVER DID!”
Can NATO Stay Out Even If the US Is Attacked?
NATO’s principle of collective defence is anchored in Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. However, Article 6 limits this obligation geographically to Europe, North America, and the North Atlantic region.
This distinction is critical. Iranian attacks on US bases in Iraq, Kuwait, or Qatar—or on US naval assets in the Persian Gulf—can be interpreted as falling outside NATO’s formal defence perimeter.
Additionally, there is broad consensus among member states that Article 5 applies to cases of unprovoked aggression. Since the US initiated military action against Iran, several allies argue that Washington cannot invoke collective defence. A similar divide was evident during the 2003 Iraq War, when Germany and France declined to participate.
Trump’s Waning Support at Home
Domestically, Trump is facing growing resistance—not only from the public but also from within his own political base—just months ahead of the midterm elections.
A key development is the resignation of Joe Kent, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center. In a statement posted on X, Kent argued that Iran “posed no imminent threat to our nation” and claimed that “we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby.”
Kent’s departure is one of the most high-profile exits since the conflict began. He is not alone: prominent conservative voices such as Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly have also criticised the war.
Why Kent Opposed the War
Kent’s opposition rests on multiple grounds: the absence of an imminent threat from Iran, perceived political pressure from Israel, and a broader rejection of deploying US troops in a conflict that offers little strategic benefit.
“As a veteran who deployed to combat 11 times, and as a Gold Star husband who lost my beloved wife Shannon in a war manufactured by Israel, I cannot support sending the next generation to fight and die in a war that serves no benefit to the American people,” Kent wrote, drawing parallels with the human and political costs of the Iraq War.
With even his core supporters stepping back, the Trump administration finds itself increasingly isolated—politically, diplomatically, and strategically. As NATO holds its ground and dissent grows within his inner circle, the White House is learning a difficult lesson in statecraft: while a superpower may be able to start a war alone, sustaining it—and securing peace—without allies is far more difficult.
