For decades, the Indian paints industry appeared immune to sudden shifts. According to a Reuters report, Asian Paints commanded a nearly 59% market share as recently as the last quarter of 2024, Berger Paints held about 18% and Kansai Nerolac maintained 13%. Dealers and painters, the crucial intermediaries between manufacturers and households, were locked in through exclusive tinting machines, loyalty schemes and decades of cultivated relationships. Entry barriers seemed impenetrable.
That picture has changed dramatically. By the end of Q4, 2025, Asian Paints’ share has slipped to about 52% and Berger and Kansai Nerolac have remained at the same levels as earlier. Meanwhile, challengers have surged. JSW Paints has climbed to a nearly 10% share following its ₹8,986 crore acquisition of Akzo Nobel India (Dulux), while Birla Opus, launched in 2024, has a 6.8% market share. Together, they have unsettled one of India’s most predictable industries.
The New Resource Order
Resource dependence theory reminds us that firms survive not by autonomy but by managing dependencies on critical external resources. In paints, these dependencies historically revolved around capacity scale, dealer exclusivity, tinting machines and painter loyalty. Asian Paints excelled at controlling these levers, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of dominance.
The disruption came not because Asian Paints lost its edge—it remains a global benchmark in supply-chain efficiency but because the resource environment itself changed. Deep-pocketed entrants flooded the sector with capital, regulators began scrutinising exclusivity arrangements and dealers and painters discovered new options. In such a context, the very dependencies that once guaranteed stability became vulnerable to reconfiguration.
The most striking example is the tinting machine. Dealers had long been bound to incumbents through these machines, which enabled shade mixing and required ongoing servicing. Birla Opus disrupted this model by distributing compact tinting machines free of cost. Dealers, once captive, suddenly found themselves courted. Distribution was rolled out at breakneck speed. In less than a year, Birla Opus built a network of 137 depots, reaching more than 6,600 towns and opening over 300 branded outlets, commanding 40% of the industry’s capacity.
In an industry where networks typically took decades to cultivate, the timeline was compressed into months. The disruption was not about operational efficiency where Asian Paints remains formidable, but about who controlled access to critical channels.
Different Rules of the Game
The obvious question is: if distribution moats can be breached in paints, why have fast-moving consumer-goods giants like HUL and ITC remained far harder to disrupt, even with the rise of quick-commerce platforms?
The answer lies in structural differences. In fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), the buyer and user are usually the same person. You buy the soap or snack you will consume. Brand choice is therefore directly influenced by advertising, pricing, and shelf visibility. With millions of outlets and high-frequency purchases, FMCG incumbents have retained dominance by ensuring their products are omnipresent, whether in kirana stores or on quick-commerce platforms. Even as quick commerce changed the channel, the incumbents adapted, integrating digital delivery into their distribution mix and reinforcing their power across both old and new systems.
Paints work differently. The one who pays is rarely the one who applies. A homeowner finances the purchase, but the painter or contractor chooses the brand, often guided by incentives, familiarity or dealer advice. Architects and interior designers exert additional influence. This separation of payer and user creates a high degree of dependency on intermediaries.
Once Birla Opus and JSW offered dealers free tinting machines and lucrative schemes to the painters, they could rewire brand choices at the point of application, even if the household paying for the paint was indifferent or unaware. The narrower retail base in paints further accentuates this vulnerability. Unlike FMCG’s millions of touchpoints, paints flow through far fewer outlets. When well-capitalised entrants move aggressively, they can sway a significant portion of the market far faster than in consumer staples.
The cumulative effect of these changes is visible. Dealers, once bound to single firms, now bargain from a position of strength. Painters, once passive recipients of loyalty schemes, are being wooed with unprecedented incentives and free equipment. Regulators, once silent, are investigating restrictive practices following complaints from Birla Opus. Even multinationals are recalibrating: Akzo Nobel chose to sell out, recognising that local conglomerates command superior capital and faster execution.
In the short run, incumbents have responded with price cuts and promotions. But if dependencies have shifted, lasting advantage will come from building new ones. Asian Paints must consider whether its celebrated distribution architecture, while still efficient, is enough in an era where exclusivity is contested.
Berger possibly needs to look beyond a discounting model and transform painters and contractors into long-term advocates through services and digital tools. JSW can integrate paints with cement and steel, offering bundled housing solutions. Pidilite may focus on embedding paints into its broader home improvement ecosystem, especially in rural India. Each strategy represents an attempt to redraw the map of dependencies rather than simply defend old ones.
Shifting Levers of Power
The Indian paints industry of 2025 is no longer a static oligopoly. It has become a laboratory for how resource dependencies can be renegotiated under pressure from capital, regulation and technology. The old levers viz. dealer exclusivity, tinting machines, painter loyalty are eroding. The new levers for the industry are clearer:
Channel loyalty has been disrupted, with dealers and painters no longer locked into a single brand.
Consumers have more credible choices, with multiple national players offering comparable quality and affordability.
Ecosystem bundling has gained traction, as conglomerates leverage trust from allied categories like JSW, drawing on cross-sector synergies arising from its presence in allied industries like cement and steel, Pidilite on adhesives and construction chemicals, to establish legitimacy in paints.
Regulatory legitimacy has emerged as a lever, forcing incumbents to defend long-standing practices under public scrutiny.
Asian Paints remains formidable, but the environment it shaped for decades has been permanently altered. Birla Opus and JSW Paints have demonstrated how quickly resource dependencies can be reconfigured when capital, incentives and ecosystem credibility converge. The lesson is clear: power lies not in defending static moats, but in continuously redrawing the map of dependencies.
Kiran Mahasuar is an assistant professor in strategy at SP Jain Institute of Management and Research
