How India’s Updated NDC Goes Beyond ‘Electrons-First’ Strategy

For a country balancing development and decarbonisation, India’s energy transition cannot mirror the West. India cannot front-load decarbonisation at the cost of development, nor defer it. What's emerging instead is the India way, that signals a shift towards a cleaner, resilient and globally competitive growth model. 

Anchored in its vision of  NetZero by 2070, India’s updated climate commitments reflect this calibrated ambition. By 2035, India aims to reduce emissions intensity of its GDP by 47% from 2005 levels, building on the 36% reduction achieved by 2020. It is targeting 60% non-fossil installed power capacity by 2035, increasing from 50% achieved by 2025. Alongside, India plans to create an additional 3.5-4bn tonnes of carbon sink. Simultaneously, India’s primary energy supply is expected to increase by 2.5 times by 2070 from 2025 levels, notwithstanding an 11-fold expected increase in GDP. While the targets are nowhere trivial, the credibility comes from how India is choosing to get there. 

The ‘Electrons-First’ Strategy  

An “electrons-first strategy" is at the heart of this approach. It implies electrification wherever possible and deploying alternative fuels wherever necessary. NITI Aayog’s recent report suggests an increase in electricity share in India’s total final energy consumption to 42% by 2050 and 60% by 2070 from the current 22%, reinforcing this strategy. The rapid expansion of solar and wind, among the cheapest sources of power, combined with investments in grid infrastructure and storage is steadily increasing the electron’s share. The near-complete electrification of railways, the accelerating shift to electric mobility and the scaling of distributed solar for agriculture and roof-tops all point toward a coherent, system-level transition.  

But India is not pursuing electrification as a dogma and recognises its limits. Sectors such as steel, fertilisers, long-haul transport and aviation require high energy-density fuels but are difficult to electrify. This is where the focus shifts to molecules such as green hydrogen, advanced biofuels, and synthetic fuels. Using green hydrogen in passenger vehicles, for instance, would require two-to-three times more electricity per kilometre than battery-electric alternatives. Yet in steelmaking, hydrogen offers a viable decarbonisation pathway. Rather than treating hydrogen as a universal solution, efforts are now focused on building an ecosystem especially targeting hard-to-abate sectors. Similarly, biofuels and by-products derived from biomass can decarbonise aviation and heavy transport without competing with food systems, provided feedstock logistics and lifecycle emissions are managed, offering multiple advantages simultaneously: reducing emissions, while addressing waste management and generating rural income.  

System Optimisation Approach 

What emerges is a shift that India is trying to make from a technology-led transition to system optimisation. The question is no longer which technology is “green”, but where each technology makes the best sense. In effect, India’s transition is not linear. It is layered, adaptive and deliberately diversified. Electrification forms the backbone and molecules fill the gaps. This approach also reframes a broader global question: is India “doing enough”? The answer depends on how the question is posed. 

In absolute terms, India’s emissions may rise in the near term, driven by rapid economic growth and rising energy demand. But per capita emissions remain less than 2 tonnes of CO2, a fraction of advanced economies. Historically, India’s contribution to cumulative emissions has been low. India is among the few major economies on track to meet its stated climate commitments and is managing all this while what may be best described as energy “quadrilemma”: expanding access, ensuring affordability, maintaining energy security and pursuing decarbonisation, all at once, under various pressures.  

The economic aftershocks of the COVID pandemic and now the disruptions triggered by the ongoing instability in West Asia have all strained global energy markets and fiscal balances. For a country, importing ~85% of its crude oil and 50% of its gas, these shocks translate directly into macroeconomic stress. Yet, even amid such volatility, India has not diluted its climate ambitions, unlike several developed economies, which have given up their climate commitments or restarting their coal plants, or have failed to deliver on climate finance. India, rather, has strengthened its commitments.  

India’s approach, therefore, is not just about domestic optimisation, but also about preserving policy sovereignty in an unequal system. It has resisted premature timelines, avoided over-reliance on costly instruments like carbon pricing and instead focused on scaling solutions suited to India’s context. There is a broader lesson here for the developing world. In energy systems where demand is still growing and capital is limited, the sequencing of transition matters. India is genuinely walking the talk.  

(Akanksha Jain is a Research Consultant, while Debajit Palit is the Centre Head at the Centre for Climate Change and Energy Transition in Chintan Research Foundation. The views expressed are personal.)