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India Emerges As Diplomatic Winner At BRICS Summit: Michael Kugelman

India’s BRICS presidency delivered what many feared could be the hardest outcome: consensus among a sharply divided and expanded grouping. But the carefully worded declaration also revealed BRICS’ central dilemma — how far can it challenge the global order when many of its members still depend on it?

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Foreign policy expert Michael Kugelman X/@MichaelKugelman
Summary
  • India secured a consensus and joint declaration at the BRICS Summit despite deep divisions within the expanded grouping

  • Michael Kugelman says this marks a significant diplomatic achievement for New Delhi

  • But BRICS remains constrained by its dependence on the US dollar, China’s economic weight and divergent views on the West

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The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi demonstrated both the growing diplomatic weight of the grouping and the limits imposed by its internal contradictions. Despite differences over the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflict in Iran, the role of the US dollar and the future direction of the bloc, India managed to secure a consensus and a joint declaration on the first day of the summit.

In an interview with Outlook Business, Michael Kugelman, South Asia analyst, said New Delhi’s ability to steer the expanded and increasingly diverse grouping towards consensus was a significant diplomatic achievement. At the same time, he argued that BRICS remains constrained by its dependence on the dollar, divergent views towards the West and China’s economic dominance.

Below are the edited excerpts from the interview:

Q

Looking at the 18th BRICS Summit as a whole, what were India’s biggest diplomatic and strategic achievements as chair, and where did New Delhi fall short of what it could realistically have delivered?

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A

The biggest achievement was getting a consensus that resulted in a joint declaration, and one that came on the first rather than the second day of the summit. This suggests that Delhi did most of the hard work in advance — another savvy move that deserves credit, because the members didn't have to spend the whole summit feeling burdened and distracted by the need to get the joint declaration out.

One could critique Delhi for releasing a statement that didn't mention the wars in Iran or Ukraine by name, but given the realities of the BRICS membership, it wouldn't be realistic to have it any other way. Likewise, the US wasn't named specifically, but again, given much of the membership's desire to avoid provoking Donald Trump, it wouldn't have been realistic to have it any other way.

Q

Did the New Delhi Summit send a sufficiently strong signal to US President Trump that BRICS should not be taken lightly, or did the grouping play it too safe by avoiding positions that could have more directly challenged the current US-led global order?

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A

I think the summit struck the right middle ground note. The declaration essentially laid out all that it thinks is wrong with the current global order, and called for reforms in the key institutions that drive that order. But it didn’t directly call out the US or propose any de-dollarisation or other initiatives meant to directly take on the US economy. That’s something that required concessions from the likes of Russia and Iran, and the fact that they agreed to them is another credit to New Delhi.

Q

Was this a missed opportunity to give BRICS a stronger economic and trade dimension?

A

BRICS is limited by its own contradictions. It wants to position itself as an alternative to the institutions that dominate the current global financial order. But because so much of its membership, including the few that are hostile to the US, is reliant on the US dollar, BRICS has to be careful not to go too far in terms of how much it pushes back against the US dollar.

In that sense, what the summit pledged to do is prudent: Lean in on what’s already there (like the new BRICS Bank) and pursue more trade opportunities among the membership. This moves the needle forward on producing substantive new initiatives without doing anything that risks undermining the US dollar in the global economy.

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Q

Who, ultimately, emerged as the real winner from the New Delhi Summit — India, China, Russia, or BRICS as a collective?

A

India is a winner on the diplomatic front for getting a consensus and a summit declaration, despite chairing a grouping that's become more fraught with the addition of multiple sets of members that don't get along.

BRICS itself is a big winner. This is a grouping with many of the world's most significant actors outside the West, and one that the Global South, which is well represented in the BRICS membership, views as an increasingly influential entity that represents its interests and concerns on the global stage.

And the fact that the group announced a series of new initiatives in Delhi shows the world, especially its many critics in the West, that it's much more than a mere talk shop.

Q

The summit took place amid the ongoing wars, US tariff threats and growing tensions in the geopolitical order. Did India succeed in positioning BRICS as a platform for the Global South, or does the grouping still lack the cohesion needed to become a meaningful alternative pole in global affairs?

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A

It's the closest thing the Global South has to a true global champion. Existing institutions that aim to advocate for the Global South, like the UN and top international financial institutions, are nonetheless dominated at the highest levels by countries outside the Global South. This makes BRICS close to unique, given that it's mostly a Global South membership — and many others from the Global South want to join — and given that because it operates based on consensus, everyone or close to everyone in it is involved in decision-making.

Q

What does the outcome of the New Delhi Summit mean for India going forward? Has India strengthened its ability to use BRICS to advance its own strategic interests and shape the Global South, or will New Delhi increasingly have to balance between BRICS, the Quad, the US and other Western partners?

A

BRICS' utility for Delhi remains the same: It advances strategic autonomy because India uses it to balance its ties between the West on the one hand and the Global South and the broader non-West on the other.

India would not want to have to choose between BRICS and the G20; it considers both important for different reasons. That said, given current uncertainties associated with the Quad and India's relations with the US, India's embrace of BRICS is likely to grow stronger, and ultimately this will help BRICS itself as well.

Q

Why did the New Delhi Declaration refrain from directly mentioning the Russia-Ukraine war or the US-led war in Iran?

A

It's all about maintaining solidarity and the need for a consensus. Directly mentioning Russia may have prompted Moscow to refuse to sign on to the statement. Linking the US by name to the criticism in the declaration about the war in Iran might have prompted the more pro-US members not to sign.

After all, the BRICS foreign ministers' summit didn't get a consensus or a declaration. India definitely didn't want to risk the most prestigious summit of BRICS under its chairship failing to get a consensus. So in that sense there was a need to be cautious.

Q

With China overwhelmingly dominating intra-BRICS trade, can BRICS really claim to be building a more balanced economic order, or is the grouping increasingly serving Beijing’s economic interests?

A

Certainly, China, as the biggest economy in BRICS, benefits if the grouping looks to expand trade with its members. But the membership, especially its poorer members, will view intra-BRICS trade as more desirable than trading in the broader global economy, given the Trump tariffs and multiple wars and other shocks that impact them disproportionately. Intra-BRICS trade may not be ideal for them, but it does provide insulation for them from all the churn in the global economy.

Q

Though, there were talks on increasing the trade within the grouping and settling the trade in local currencies but there was no mention of de-dollarisation. What does it signify?

A

This shows two things: first, much of the membership doesn't want to provoke Trump, who not too long ago threatened to slap tariffs on BRICS members that undercut the dollar. Second, BRICS itself is too reliant on the dollar to be willing to take it on. This is one of the fundamental contradictions behind BRICS, along with the fact that a small but determined minority of the membership wants it to be more anti-West than most of it is comfortable with.

Q

Does Trump’s silence on BRICS followed by this sanctions law suggest Washington is shifting from rhetoric to economic pressure on the grouping?

A

The sanctions law isn't tied to BRICS, it's tied to the war in Ukraine and a wider US pressure campaign against Russian oil purchasers. I actually think the nature of the joint declaration, which avoided identifying the US by name, was one reason for the US silence.

There were some striking optics, like photos of Modi together with Putin and Xi. That has triggered Trump in the past. But in this case, the fact that Trump was planning a critical meeting with Xi soon may have compelled him to hold back.

Q

Could targeting India and China over Russian energy ultimately push BRICS members closer together?

A

The sanctions bill could end up being an own goal for Washington, as it will vindicate for the BRICS membership the need to work more together economically and financially to fend off global economic shocks that in many cases are being inflicted by Trump's policies.