Within the chartered accountant community in Chennai, the buzz on Lakshmi Vilas Bank did not sound favourable. Amid official denial it was clear that the institution with a 90-year history had crossed the line and done the unthinkable. That was two years ago in 2018 and LVB, as it is known, was said to be facing a systemic breakdown – allegations of favoured lending and potential defaults not being flagged off in time, were rife.
A report on the bank’s internal systems and processes with adverse comments was downplayed. A well-known chartered accountant in the city says that was an indication that things were going downhill. “There were a few other banks that were also involved but LVB being in that group was a shocker since it was known for high level of diligence,” he describes with incredulity.
Pretty soon, the bank which was set up in 1926 would face a crisis which would lead to the promoter losing control and equity holders being wiped out. Its gross non-performing assets hitting 25% would push it beyond redemption as suitors played hard to get. The story of how LVB ended up where it has is one of misplaced ambition, unbridled power and mismanagement by its promoter.
Lining up dominoes
In 2016, when the credit review committee at LVB sat down to assess a proposal from Mumbai-based Talwalkars, whose core business is fitness clubs, there was high level of discomfort. Unconvinced about the business model, it rejected the Rs.1.2 billion loan application with a terse “not safe”. It was assumed that the story ended right there.
A month later, an enthusiastic KR Pradeep, a director on the bank’s board, brought it up again. Instead of sanctioning a loan of around Rs.1.2 billion, he suggested LVB subscribe to Talwalkars non-convertible debentures (NCDs). A former official present during the discussion says, “He knew it could be risky and decided to take the debenture route. For some reason, Pradeep was very keen on it though it seemed like a bad idea.” That apprehension was not without merit as Talwalkars eventually defaulted. In all, the total outstanding (counting unpaid interest) now stands at Rs.1.50 billion, with little hope of that money ever coming back.
Much of LVB’s aggression, transitioning from a bank that primarily catered to SMEs to one that went after large corporates was the brainchild of Pradeep. A chartered accountant, he got on LVB’s board in February 2009. The story goes that the break was facilitated by Kusuma Muniraju, a director on LVB’s board. Muniraju, an advocate, had shared office space with Pradeep in his earlier days. The friendship blossomed over time and culminated with him getting on to the board of the bank. No one was quite prepared for what was to follow. With a holding of around 5%, Pradeep would irretrievably alter the fortunes of LVB.
The process of bringing in a professional CEO was initiated in early 2010 and by August that year, it roped in PR Somasundaram from Standard Chartered. That was the beginning of a revolving saga where CEOs joined and departed abruptly. Over a decade, there were four occupants of the corner office. Once Somasundaram moved out in November 2012 after being around for less than two years, the board elevated KSR Anjaneyulu, then the bank’s ED and earlier with ING Vysya Bank, to the top job. In early 2014, Rakesh Sharma came aboard from SBI. Like his predecessors, his tenure was a short one and in September 2015, he put in his papers. Then came Parthasarathi Mukherjee from Axis Bank who stuck around for close to four years.
Banking circles say post Mukherjee no professional was willing to come aboard with LVB finally elevating S Sundar, the bank’s CFO, in January 2020 (See: Firesale in the making). Those who have worked closely with Pradeep describe him as someone with an “iron grip on the bank.” Regardless of the image of professionalism that LVB wanted to portray to the outside world, it was really his gig. He handpicked all the board members and in return, he got their loyalty. No decision taken by him, be it lending or anything that was strategic, was ever questioned by them. In fact, they were happy to tag along.
Even as potential suitors kept getting rejected, Pradeep worked towards getting the investing community on to his side. When the stock was quoting at Rs.50, he kept telling them it would be up 3x. “This story was sold to brokers, associates and friends across the country. They just lapped it up and, on every resolution, they voted for him. It was impossible to oppose him on anything given the support he enjoyed,” says the same official quoted above.
Without a doubt, the biggest hit will be Religare Finvest (RFL), the NBFC arm of Religare Enterprises, an entity looking to recover Rs.9.5 billion (including interest) from LVB. The allegation is that two LVB officials joined hands with erstwhile Religare promoters Malvinder and Shivinder Singh to misappropriate the money that was parked in fixed deposits. LVB had loaned Rs.7.5 billion (around 3% of LVB’s balance sheet) to the brothers without authorisation, which later had been set off against RFL’s fixed deposits.
This time around, things did not quite go as planned for Pradeep. A note put out by proxy advisory firm, IIAS on September 22, was blunt and spoke of LVB having been confronted with losses for the last ten quarters, an eroding deposit base, high NPAs, negative Tier-1 capital ratio. “It rarely gets this ugly and yet LVB powers on backed only the promise that it will shortly inject capital,” the note stated. Eventually, the shareholders voted against the reappointment of the CEO apart from seven directors (Pradeep included) and the auditors as well. It is learnt that the institutions voted against the reappointment barring Indiabulls, which holds 4.99% stake in LVB.
Amit Tandon, co-founder, IIAS says in the pecking order, the depositors' interest is usually protected. Given that deposit holders need to be retained, equity investors are taking the hit as the entire paid-up capital has been written off (See: Contentious write-off). “Three years of losses and a negative networth means this is the harsh reality that equity holders need to confront,” adds Tandon.
A person privy to the negotiation says the bank believed there was value in the license and in the 563-branch network. More importantly, how much shareholding Clix would control was also a thorny issue. It initially wanted 90%, while the bank was not willing to cede beyond 60%. After many rounds of negotiations, Clix appeared to have settled for 80%.