What happens is that whenever we undertake a reform exercise, we are normally constrained by keeping the exercise limited. In that process, real reform does not take place. If we impose too many restraints on ourselves, then reform cannot truly happen.
Fundamentally, when GST was introduced, items were placed at particular rates on the basis of the tax incidence on those items prior to GST—through central excise duty and VAT. That is why cement was taxed at 28%. But cement never really merited attracting 28%, since it is used in the construction sector. Other items like iron and steel, which also go into construction, were placed at 18%.
The philosophy at that time was to keep it revenue-neutral. But after eight years, if we conduct the exercise with the same mindset and constraints, then real reform cannot take place.
So, this time, that is the fundamental change which could result in a transformative reform. What was done was to address the fact that a lot of classification disputes were arising because of so many rate slabs—5%, 12%, 18%, and 28%.
For example, in the food sector, where the maximum disputes arose, items were either exempted or taxed at 5%, 12%, or 18%. This sector is constantly evolving, with new food products entering the market due to changes in manufacturing technology. These new products could be classified either by their common parlance or by their manufacturing process, leading to disputes, since classification is done as per the HSN code, which originates on the customs side. While some fine-tuning of classification is done there, in GST the same goods are spread across the tariff and attract different rates.
Therefore, the first thought was that we should reduce the number of tax rates. There should be a standard rate of 18%, and a merit rate for goods that deserve a lower rate because they are mass-consumption items. With that mindset, each item was examined and placed at an appropriate rate. Some goods, particularly luxury goods, have been placed at a special rate of 40%.
That is why this change in approach is fundamental. Real reform could not have happened if we had remained stuck in the earlier framework. For example, if cement was reduced from 28% to 18%, but kept at 20% to play safe, the reform would have been a non-starter. To make the reform effective, bold decisions were required. At some point after the introduction of GST, such a reform becomes necessary, and it requires strong leadership to provide the boldness to the revenue department to conduct the exercise. This way, real reform happens. It is not a reform in name only.